The ongoing legal battle over federal funding restrictions for sanctuary jurisdictions represents a significant constitutional conflict between executive authority and local governance. As the Trump administration implements new executive orders targeting cities and states that limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, courts across the country are evaluating whether these actions violate core constitutional principles including the Tenth Amendment, the Spending Clause, and separation of powers. These executive actions attempt to withhold billions in federal grants from jurisdictions that have adopted policies protecting undocumented immigrants from certain forms of federal immigration enforcement, creating unprecedented tension between federal immigration priorities and local control over law enforcement resources.
The legal challenges to these funding restrictions highlight fundamental questions about federalism and the limits of executive power. While the federal government maintains exclusive authority over immigration policy, the Constitution places significant constraints on how that authority can be exercised, particularly when it involves coercing state and local governments. As these cases move through the federal court system, they establish important precedents regarding the constitutional boundaries between federal and local authority, with far-reaching implications for immigration enforcement, public safety, and the distribution of federal resources across thousands of American communities.
Historical Context of Sanctuary Policies
Sanctuary policies emerged in the 1980s when churches and local governments began offering protection to refugees fleeing civil wars in Central America. These early sanctuary movements were primarily humanitarian responses to what many viewed as overly restrictive federal immigration policies that failed to recognize legitimate asylum claims. Over time, these informal practices evolved into formal local ordinances and state laws limiting cooperation with federal immigration authorities in various ways.
Modern sanctuary jurisdiction policies typically restrict local law enforcement from inquiring about immigration status, limit detention based solely on immigration detainer requests, or prohibit sharing certain information with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These policies vary significantly in scope and implementation across jurisdictions. Some cities, like San Francisco and Chicago, have adopted comprehensive sanctuary ordinances that broadly limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, while others have implemented more narrowly tailored policies addressing specific aspects of cooperation. This diversity of approaches reflects the different priorities, demographics, and political environments of local communities across the country.
The justifications for sanctuary policies have evolved over time. While humanitarian concerns remain important, many jurisdictions now emphasize public safety arguments, contending that separating local policing from immigration enforcement encourages immigrant community cooperation with law enforcement. Police chiefs and sheriffs in many jurisdictions support these policies, arguing that when undocumented immigrants fear deportation from any police interaction, they become less likely to report crimes or serve as witnesses, undermining community policing efforts. This public safety rationale has become central to legal defenses of sanctuary policies against federal challenges.
Constitutional Foundations of the Legal Conflict
The legal battle over sanctuary cities centers on several key constitutional principles, with the Tenth Amendment playing a particularly crucial role. This amendment, which reserves powers not delegated to the federal government to the states or the people, forms the basis for the anti-commandeering doctrine. This doctrine, developed through Supreme Court precedents including Printz v. United States and New York v. United States, prohibits the federal government from compelling states to implement federal regulatory programs or enforce federal law.
The anti-commandeering principle directly applies to federal attempts to mandate local cooperation with immigration enforcement. When the federal government threatens to withhold funding unless local jurisdictions dedicate resources to federal immigration priorities, it potentially violates this constitutional principle by attempting to commandeer local law enforcement resources. Courts have consistently recognized that while the federal government has exclusive authority over immigration policy, it cannot force states and localities to participate in enforcing that policy. This distinction between federal authority to establish immigration law and limitations on compelling state enforcement has become central to judicial analysis of sanctuary jurisdiction cases.
Another key constitutional constraint comes from the Spending Clause, which governs Congress’s authority to attach conditions to federal funding. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court established that while Congress may use federal funds to incentivize state action, any conditions must be unambiguous, related to the federal interest in the program, and not coercive. Additionally, the conditions cannot induce states to engage in unconstitutional activities. Executive actions attempting to impose new conditions on existing federal grants face significant scrutiny under these requirements, particularly when the conditions appear unrelated to the original purpose of the funding or when they were not clearly established when the funding was authorized.
Executive Orders Targeting Sanctuary Jurisdictions
President Trump’s executive orders on sanctuary jurisdictions represent unprecedented attempts to use federal funding as leverage against local immigration policies. The most significant of these, Executive Order 13768 issued in January 2017, declared that jurisdictions failing to comply with federal immigration enforcement would be ineligible for federal grants. This broad directive was followed by more specific Department of Justice policies imposing immigration-related conditions on various grant programs, including the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program, which provides substantial funding to local law enforcement agencies nationwide.
These executive actions establish several specific requirements for receiving federal funds. They mandate that jurisdictions allow federal immigration officials access to detention facilities to interview detainees about their immigration status, provide at least 48 hours’ notice before releasing an individual wanted by immigration authorities, and certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits local governments from restricting information sharing with federal immigration authorities. These conditions apply to existing grant programs that previously had no immigration-related requirements, raising questions about executive authority to unilaterally modify congressional funding authorizations.
The implementation of these orders has evolved in response to legal challenges. After initial court defeats, the administration has attempted to narrow the scope of affected funding and provide more specific justifications for the immigration-related conditions. However, these modifications have not resolved the fundamental constitutional questions about executive authority to impose new conditions on congressionally authorized funding. As these executive actions continue to evolve, courts must evaluate whether each new iteration addresses the constitutional deficiencies identified in previous versions or simply repackages the same constitutional violations in different terms.
The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine and Its Applications
The anti-commandeering doctrine provides one of the strongest legal defenses for sanctuary jurisdictions. This principle, firmly established in Supreme Court precedent, prohibits the federal government from commandeering state and local resources to implement federal programs. In Printz v. United States, the Court struck down provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The Court held that the federal government cannot compel states to enact or administer federal regulatory programs, regardless of the importance of the federal policy objectives.
This doctrine directly applies to immigration detainer requests, which ask local law enforcement to hold individuals beyond their release date to facilitate transfer to federal immigration authorities. Courts have increasingly recognized that requiring local jurisdictions to honor these detainer requests constitutes unconstitutional commandeering. Local officials must dedicate personnel, jail space, and resources to federal immigration enforcement priorities, effectively being pressed into federal service. Moreover, complying with detainer requests may expose localities to liability for Fourth Amendment violations if the extended detention lacks probable cause beyond the immigration violation, which is a civil rather than criminal matter.
The anti-commandeering principle also applies to information-sharing requirements. While 8 U.S.C. § 1373 prohibits local governments from restricting information sharing with federal immigration authorities, courts have questioned whether this provision itself violates anti-commandeering principles by dictating how states and localities manage their information. In several cases, courts have suggested that § 1373 may be unconstitutional under the reasoning of Murphy v. NCAA, a 2018 Supreme Court decision that expanded anti-commandeering protections to prohibit the federal government from dictating what states cannot do, not just what they must do. This evolving interpretation potentially undermines a key legal basis for the administration’s sanctuary city policies.
Spending Clause Limitations on Funding Conditions
The Spending Clause of the Constitution provides Congress with the power to “provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” which includes authority to attach conditions to federal funding. However, this power is not unlimited. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court established a four-part test for conditional spending: (1) the spending must promote the general welfare, (2) the condition must be unambiguous, (3) the condition must relate to the federal interest in the program, and (4) the condition cannot induce states to engage in unconstitutional activities. Additionally, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court added that funding conditions cannot be so coercive as to pass the point where “pressure turns into compulsion.”
Executive actions imposing new immigration-related conditions on existing federal grants face significant challenges under this framework. Courts have particularly focused on the “relatedness” requirement, questioning whether immigration enforcement conditions bear any relationship to the purposes of grants like the JAG program, which focuses on supporting local law enforcement initiatives to reduce violent crime. When grants established for one purpose are suddenly conditioned on compliance with unrelated policy objectives, courts have often found this to violate the Spending Clause limitations.
The “unambiguity” requirement presents another obstacle, as it demands that states have clear notice of funding conditions when they choose to accept federal money. When new conditions are imposed after grants have been established and accepted, recipients have no opportunity to make an informed choice about whether to accept the funds with those conditions attached. Courts have consistently held that retroactively imposing new conditions violates this constitutional requirement, as states must have clear notice of all conditions at the time they accept federal funds.
Judicial Responses to Executive Actions
Federal courts have largely blocked implementation of executive actions targeting sanctuary jurisdictions, finding significant constitutional deficiencies in these initiatives. The first major decision came in County of Santa Clara v. Trump, where the Northern District of California issued a nationwide injunction against Executive Order 13768, finding that the order likely violated separation of powers principles by attempting to place new conditions on federal funds without congressional authorization. The court also found the order unconstitutionally vague and potentially coercive under the Tenth Amendment.
Subsequent litigation has focused on specific immigration-related conditions imposed on DOJ grant programs. In City of Chicago v. Sessions, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against these conditions, finding that they likely exceeded the Attorney General’s statutory authority and violated the separation of powers. Similarly, in City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit held that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to impose immigration-related conditions on JAG grants. These decisions emphasize that the executive branch cannot unilaterally impose new substantive conditions on funds authorized by Congress for specific purposes.
Not all judicial responses have been uniform, however. In City of Los Angeles v. Barr, the Ninth Circuit upheld the DOJ’s authority to give preferential consideration to jurisdictions that cooperate with immigration enforcement when awarding discretionary grants under the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. This decision distinguished between mandatory conditions on formula grants, which courts have generally rejected, and preferential factors for competitive grants, where agencies may have greater discretion. This distinction highlights the nuanced legal analysis courts apply to different types of federal funding programs.
Separation of Powers Concerns
The executive actions against sanctuary jurisdictions raise significant separation of powers questions about the respective roles of Congress and the President in establishing conditions for federal funding. The Constitution vests the spending power in Congress, not the executive branch. When the President or executive agencies attempt to impose substantive policy conditions on federal funds without congressional authorization, they potentially usurp legislative authority in violation of constitutional design.
Courts examining these executive actions have consistently emphasized that the executive branch possesses only the authority to implement congressional funding decisions, not to establish new substantive policy conditions. For example, in City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit held that “the Executive Branch has no constitutional authority to condition the payment of federal funds on adherence to its political priorities.” This principle applies regardless of the policy merits of the conditions or their relationship to legitimate federal objectives. The constitutional question centers on who has the authority to establish these conditions, not whether the conditions themselves serve important purposes.
This separation of powers analysis extends beyond sanctuary jurisdiction cases to establish important precedents about executive authority more broadly. By limiting executive discretion to modify congressionally authorized funding programs, these cases reinforce fundamental constitutional constraints on executive power. They establish that even when pursuing legitimate policy objectives like immigration enforcement, the executive branch must respect constitutional boundaries and cannot circumvent congressional authority by unilaterally imposing new conditions on federal funding.
Federalism and Local Control Over Law Enforcement
Underlying the legal battles over sanctuary policies is a fundamental question about federalism and local control over law enforcement resources. The Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty where both federal and state governments exercise authority within their respective spheres. Law enforcement has traditionally been considered primarily a state and local responsibility, with federal involvement limited to specific areas of national concern. Sanctuary policies reflect local determinations about how best to allocate limited law enforcement resources to serve community safety needs.
Local officials often justify sanctuary policies as necessary for effective community policing. When immigrant communities fear that any police interaction could lead to deportation, they become less likely to report crimes, cooperate with investigations, or serve as witnesses. This undermines public safety for everyone, not just immigrants. Many law enforcement leaders support sanctuary policies precisely because they believe these policies enhance their ability to protect all community members by fostering trust between police and immigrant populations. These public safety justifications reflect legitimate local policy judgments about how best to serve their communities.
The principle of local control over law enforcement priorities has received significant judicial recognition in sanctuary city cases. In City of Chicago v. Sessions, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that “the power of state and local governments to determine the duties and powers of their own agents” represents a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment. By attempting to dictate how local law enforcement agencies allocate their resources and personnel, federal immigration enforcement mandates potentially infringe on this core aspect of state sovereignty, regardless of the federal government’s authority over immigration policy itself.
Impact on Public Safety and Community Policing
Proponents of sanctuary policies argue that separating local law enforcement from federal immigration enforcement enhances public safety by encouraging immigrant cooperation with police. When undocumented immigrants fear that any police interaction could lead to deportation, they become less likely to report crimes or provide information to law enforcement. This creates “shadow populations” vulnerable to criminal victimization and undermines community policing efforts that depend on trust between law enforcement and all community members.
Research on the relationship between sanctuary policies and crime rates provides mixed results, though several studies suggest these policies may enhance public safety. A 2017 study by the Center for American Progress found that sanctuary counties experience, on average, 35.5 fewer crimes per 10,000 people compared to non-sanctuary counties with similar demographic characteristics. Similarly, a study published in the Journal of Urban Economics found no evidence that sanctuary policies increase crime rates and some evidence they may reduce certain types of crime. These findings challenge the narrative that sanctuary policies undermine public safety by protecting criminal aliens.
Law enforcement perspectives on sanctuary policies vary, though many police chiefs in major cities support these measures as tools for effective community policing. Organizations like the Major Cities Chiefs Association have expressed concern that involving local police in immigration enforcement undermines community trust and diverts resources from core public safety missions. These professional judgments about effective policing strategies deserve significant weight in evaluating the practical impacts of federal attempts to mandate local cooperation with immigration enforcement, regardless of one’s position on broader immigration policy questions.
Practical Implications for Local Governments
Local governments face difficult practical choices when navigating federal pressure against sanctuary policies. The potential loss of federal funding creates significant financial risks, particularly for jurisdictions heavily dependent on federal grants for essential services. The JAG program alone provides hundreds of millions of dollars annually to support local law enforcement initiatives, equipment purchases, and personnel costs. Losing access to these funds could force difficult budgetary choices and potentially undermine public safety initiatives.
At the same time, complying with federal immigration enforcement requests carries its own costs and risks. Honoring detainer requests requires dedicating jail space, personnel, and resources to federal immigration priorities rather than local public safety needs. Moreover, multiple courts have held that detaining individuals solely on the basis of immigration detainers without probable cause of a crime may violate the Fourth Amendment, exposing localities to civil liability. Several jurisdictions have faced costly lawsuits after holding individuals on immigration detainers later determined to be unlawful.
These competing pressures place local officials in a difficult position, forced to balance financial considerations, legal risks, community values, and public safety priorities. Some jurisdictions have attempted to navigate these tensions by adopting more limited non-cooperation policies that comply with federal requirements while still maintaining some separation between local policing and immigration enforcement. Others have chosen to challenge federal funding restrictions directly through litigation, accepting the financial risks to defend their policy autonomy. These varied responses reflect the complex practical realities local governments face in this contentious policy area.
Immigration Detainers and Fourth Amendment Concerns
Immigration detainer requests ask local law enforcement to hold individuals for up to 48 hours beyond their scheduled release date to facilitate transfer to federal immigration authorities. These detainers raise significant Fourth Amendment concerns, as they typically do not include a judicial warrant or probable cause determination for the extended detention. Since immigration violations are generally civil rather than criminal matters, several courts have held that detention based solely on suspected immigration status without criminal probable cause violates constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.
In cases like Galarza v. Szalczyk and Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, federal courts have held local jurisdictions liable for Fourth Amendment violations when they detained individuals solely on the basis of immigration detainers without probable cause of a crime. These decisions emphasize that local officials cannot rely on federal detainer requests as legal authorization for detention that would otherwise violate constitutional rights. This creates significant legal risks for jurisdictions that honor detainer requests, potentially exposing them to civil liability for unlawful detention.
These Fourth Amendment concerns provide another legal justification for sanctuary policies beyond federalism principles. When local jurisdictions decline to honor immigration detainers, they may be acting not just to preserve local control over law enforcement resources but also to avoid potential constitutional violations. This defensive rationale has received less attention in policy debates but represents an important legal consideration for local officials evaluating their obligations under federal immigration enforcement requests.
Recent Developments in Sanctuary Jurisdiction Litigation
The legal landscape surrounding sanctuary jurisdictions continues to evolve through ongoing litigation across multiple federal circuits. Recent cases have focused increasingly on statutory rather than constitutional questions, examining whether the executive branch possesses statutory authority to impose immigration-related conditions on specific grant programs. This approach allows courts to resolve cases on narrower grounds without reaching broader constitutional questions about executive power and federalism.
The Supreme Court has thus far declined to directly address the constitutionality of sanctuary jurisdiction policies or federal funding restrictions targeting these jurisdictions. In 2018, the Court denied certiorari in a case challenging California’s sanctuary state law (SB 54), leaving in place a Ninth Circuit decision upholding the law against federal preemption claims. Similarly, in 2020, the Court declined to hear the Trump administration’s challenge to a Second Circuit decision blocking immigration-related conditions on JAG grants. These denials have left in place a patchwork of lower court decisions that generally limit federal authority to financially penalize sanctuary jurisdictions.
As litigation continues, new executive actions may attempt to navigate around judicial limitations by modifying the specific mechanisms used to pressure sanctuary jurisdictions. For example, rather than imposing direct conditions on existing grants, the administration might create new preferential grant programs that reward cooperation with immigration enforcement without explicitly penalizing non-cooperation. These evolving approaches will likely generate new rounds of litigation testing the boundaries of executive authority to influence local immigration enforcement policies through federal funding mechanisms.
Broader Implications for Federalism and Executive Power
The sanctuary city cases establish important precedents regarding federalism and executive power that extend far beyond immigration policy. By limiting the executive branch’s authority to unilaterally impose new conditions on federal funding, these decisions reinforce constitutional constraints that protect state autonomy across many policy areas. Future administrations of either party may face similar limitations when attempting to use federal funding to advance policy priorities without congressional authorization.
These cases also highlight the importance of the anti-commandeering doctrine as a structural protection for federalism in an era of expanding federal power. By preventing the federal government from commandeering state and local resources, this doctrine preserves meaningful policy autonomy for state and local governments even in policy areas where federal authority is substantial. This protection applies regardless of the specific policy preferences of the administration in power, serving as a neutral structural principle rather than a partisan tool.
The sanctuary jurisdiction litigation demonstrates how federalism can protect policy diversity and local democratic accountability. When different jurisdictions can adopt different approaches to the relationship between local law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement, they can respond to the specific needs and values of their communities. This policy diversity allows for democratic experimentation and accountability at the local level, potentially generating valuable insights about effective governance approaches that might be lost under a uniform federal mandate.
Conclusion: Constitutional Principles and Policy Debates
The legal battles over federal funding restrictions for sanctuary jurisdictions ultimately center on fundamental constitutional principles rather than specific policy preferences about immigration enforcement. While reasonable people may disagree about the wisdom of sanctuary policies, the constitutional limitations on federal authority to coerce state and local governments remain essential safeguards in our federal system. These limitations protect local democratic accountability and prevent federal overreach regardless of which party controls the federal government or the specific policy area at issue.
As courts continue to evaluate executive actions targeting sanctuary jurisdictions, they must balance legitimate federal interests in immigration enforcement against constitutional protections for state sovereignty. This balancing requires careful attention to the specific mechanisms used to influence local policies, distinguishing between permissible incentives and unconstitutional coercion. It also requires recognition that while the federal government possesses exclusive authority over immigration policy, it cannot circumvent constitutional constraints on how that authority is exercised.
The ongoing legal conflict over sanctuary jurisdictions and federal funding illustrates the enduring importance of constitutional federalism in American governance. By maintaining boundaries between federal and local authority, these constitutional principles preserve space for policy diversity, democratic experimentation, and responsiveness to local conditions and values. Whatever one’s views on immigration policy, these structural protections for federalism serve essential functions in our constitutional system that transcend partisan debates about specific policy questions.
Citations:
- https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/12/perkins-coie-trump-executive-order-025783
- https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/14/us/politics/trump-law-firm.html
- https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trumps-orders-targeting-law-firms-raise-constitutional-concerns-experts-say-2025-03-08/
- https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/12/politics/perkins-coie-trump-executive-order-challenge/index.html
- https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/5201264-trump-attacks-big-law-firms/
- https://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-blocks-trump-law-firm-perkins-coie-executive-order/
- https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/12/us/politics/trump-law-firms-perkins-coie.html
- https://www.npr.org/2025/03/11/g-s1-53218/perkins-coie-trump-law-firm
- https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-broadens-temporary-block-on-trump-using-alien-enemies-act-to-remove-immigrants-from-the-u-s
- https://www.npr.org/2025/03/12/g-s1-53422/judge-blocks-trump-law-firm
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD7xzxP-K7g
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/addressing-risks-from-paul-weiss/
- https://www.thefire.org/news/trumps-attack-law-firms-threatens-foundations-our-justice-system
- https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/trump-escalates-fight-with-big-law-firms-targeting-paul-weiss-33e47144
- https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol40/iss3/2/
- https://www.acslaw.org/inbrief/what-is-an-executive-order-and-what-legal-weight-does-it-carry/
- https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-campaigned-as-a-protector-of-free-speech-but-critics-say-his-actions-threaten-it
- https://www.techdirt.com/2025/03/18/trump-tests-how-many-law-firms-he-can-destroy-before-someone-stops-him/
- https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/how-trumps-proposed-radical-expansion-of-executive-power-will-impact-our-freedoms
- https://www.democracydocket.com/opinion/the-sharks-circling-the-boat/
- https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/03/18/trump-law-firms-revenge/
- https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/11/politics/chilling-effect-trump-legal-establishment/index.html
- https://www.reuters.com/world/us/some-us-lawyers-decry-trump-orders-their-law-firms-stay-silent-2025-03-18/
- https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/statement-regarding-j-g-g-v-trump
- https://www.cbsnews.com/news/venezuelan-immigrants-sue-trump-over-order-invoking-wartime-alien-enemies-act-of-1798/
- https://democracyforward.org/updates/aclu-df-tro-broaden/
English 
Español de México